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1. Introduction
It is a widely accepted view that research and development (R&D) is an important determinant of
competitiveness, economic growth and development. Despite this central role, economists have often
stressed the difficulty that firms might encounter in financing this type of activities. This, first of
all, depends on the fact that the final outcome of an R&D project is perceived as riskier, relatively
to more traditional investment in physical capital, both in terms of maturity and probability of
success. A second reason is that the assessment of risk is complicated by the intrinsic characteristic
of R&D activities which exacerbate the information asymmetries between inside investors (the
innovator entrepreneurs) and the outside investors and financiers.
R&D activities are, typically, skilled-labor intensive. During the development of a project, a
large fraction of R&D expenditure goes into the formation of the firm’s ‘soft’ capital, a peculiar
intangible asset which constitutes the firm’s knowledge base. ‘Soft’ capital includes, for example,
the organizational competence of the entrepreneur/managers and the technical experience of the
employees. More generally, it can be thought to consist of any type of un-codified, or tacit, firm-
specific input which improves the company expected profitability; the likelihood that a certain
expenditure on physical capital and labor will result in ‘high’ profit realizations.1 An immediate
consequence of these characteristics for the financial policy of the firm is that knowledge capital
represents a poor source of collateral: because of its idiosyncratic nature and serendipity, it is clearly
hard to measure; and, being firm-specific, it has a low salvage value. This is true even in absence
of asymmetric information (or conditional to the available information as in e.g. see Berger and
Udell, 1990). A second relevant consequence is that these characteristics of R&D activities are a
natural and powerful source of information asymmetries.
Even when R&D investment project leads to a verifiable final outcome, a certifiable product
or process innovation, asymmetric information makes harder for outside investors and financiers
to assess its risk both at an ex-ante and at an interim stage. At the ex-ante stage, at least two
main difficulties arise. First, the likelihood of success and realization of a R&D project strongly
depends on the quality of the project and/or on entrepreneurial abilities; characteristics on which
the innovator firm is better informed. Thus, analogously to Akerlof (1970), outside investors might
ask the entrepreneur to pay a lemon-premium to compensate for the possibility that the project is
of a lower quality than claimed; something that is reinforced for longer term projects, in Leland and
Pyle (1977). Alternatively to prevent adverse selection, debt contracts might entail moderate risk
premia but face severer credit restrictions, or rationing, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). A second
argument for information asymmetries at the ex-ante stage is that the outcome of a R&D project
strongly depends on entrepreneurial effort, and thus it is subject to moral hazard. In fact, for any
given project and entrepreneur qualities, the probability of innovating depends on the entrepreneur’s
commitment to the project, also in terms of actual expenditure, and might induce lenders to raise
credit margins or collateral requirements (e.g. see Chan and Thakor, 1987).
All these characteristics, the quality of a project as well as the ability and effort/commitment of
its entrepreneur proponent, are typically neither directly observable by outside investors, nor fully
revealed by data on competitors and industry performance. Indeed, R&D projects in the technology
1See, for example, the discussion in Hubbard (1988), page 198.
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or science base sector are normally unique to the developer firm, hence not much can be learned by
observing the return from other firms operating in the industry. This is not so in more traditional
capital intensive sectors, where the expected returns from investing in a firm tend to comove more
closely with the sectorial average; something that makes applicable standard models of risk.
Research projects are usually more difficult to evaluate also at an interim-stage. In fact, during
a project implementation, inside investors, fearing imitation, are reluctant to disclose information,
either directly or through delegated monitoring (e.g., see Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Anton
and Yao, 1998). Information disclosure is also discouraged by the accounting measurement and
reporting rules, which tend to treat R&D differently from other investments: in the US, R&D
expenditure is immediately inscribed in financial statements, so that no information on the value
and productivity changes of research projects is reported to investors. In contrast, such information
for investments in tangible capital are available on a quarterly base.
The empirical literature has recently provided some strong evidence in support of the negative
effect of asymmetric information and financial frictions on R&D investments, even in economies
with thick financial markets, a well developed system of specialized intermediaries and venture
capitalists. The capital structure of R&D-intensive firms tends to exhibit considerably less leverage
than that of other firms (see Friend and Lang, 1988; Hall, 1992; and Bhagat and Welch, 1995). Hall
and Lerner (2010) surveying the up-to-date empirical studies, essentially, conclude that,
• large established firms do appear to resort more to internal funds for financing R&D in-
vestments and are especially active in managing their cash flow to ensure this;
• small and young innovative firms experience higher costs of capital that are only partly
mitigated by the presence of venture capital;
• there is a clear and diffused evidence that debt (mostly bank loans) is the least used source
of finance.
In other words, R&D intensive firms seem to display a financial hierarchy, privileging internal
sources to equity and equity to debt financing. Of these empirical findings, the greater respon-
siveness of R&D investments to cash flow in economies with thicker financial markets is the most
difficult to explain. One may argue that this responsiveness signals that firms rely more on outside
financing and are borrowing constrained; but may as well say that it is simply the result of a greater
sensitivity of firms to the general economic conditions, such as the demand level. The hypothesis
of a demand-linked effect has been rejected by Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2012), who show that
financial constraints matter for R&D investments of publicly traded European firms. Borisova and
Brown (2013) reinforce this result documenting that innovative firms tend to liquidate tangible
assets to finance R&D in economic downturns, when the market demand drops.
The fact that traditional bank loans seem to be the least preferred source of outside funding
could either be interpreted as the consequence of asymmetric information and of the implied credit
restrictions (rationing and collateral requirements), or as the consequence of a firm’s rational choice.
The first explanation seems convincing especially in the absence of a developed market for venture
capital, if one considers that standard bank loans have some very appealing characteristics for a firm
with intense R&D activities. In fact, its payment schedule prescribes that, if the firm is successful,
it is granted all net profits (i.e. effort and abilities are rewarded with the investment surplus they
generate); if instead it fails and the firm goes bankrupt, usual limited-liability clauses leaves an
3
high knowledge-base firm exposed to mild losses from asset confiscation (e.g. see Gale and Hellwig,
1985; Innes, 1990). Instead, in an economy with a highly developed system of venture capitalists,
low-leverage financing can be preferable especially by start-up and innovative firms in their early
stage. Specialized venture capital funds are technically more experienced and have a better moni-
toring technology, which they use both to discriminate projects and to extract information at their
interim stage. Thus, venture-capital contracts may simply be more attractive to some firms because
they mitigate information asymmetries and do not expose entrepreneurs to rationing or expensive
collateral requirements.
In spite of the recognized relevance of asymmetric information and financial frictions, these have
been largely ignored in modern innovation-based endogenous growth theory, started by Romer
(1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991). In the present paper we try to fill
this gap proposing a simple dynamic GE model in which entrepreneurs are simultaneously engaged
in technological innovation and financial decisions. In short, our economy is a Shumpeterian version
of a growth model. Innovation, when it occurs, results in an increase of factor productivity and in
a patent award to the innovator. Patents can be licensed by the innovator entrepreneur before they
expire. Innovation depends on entrepreneurs ability and commitment (R&D expenditure), and the
individual likelihood to innovate is assumed to be an increasing function of both such ingredients.
Because ability is private information, adverse selection and moral hazard might emerge. This
motivates the introduction of financial frictions in a particular form of ‘markets segmentation’.
Precisely, we assume that firms’ equity are not traded directly, but they are intermediated by
private equity-funds, who ‘pool’ them into a composite security. Because of limited commitment
(i.e., possibility of default) also loans financing is subject to debt limits and the severity of such
limits reflects asymmetric information. Except for the market of patent licenses, which operates as
a monopoly, the economy is perfectly competitive.
The equilibrium concept proposed is rich enough to represent investment and innovation deci-
sions, firms’ financial policy decisions and decisions regarding technology adoption/diffusion through
patent licensing. We argue, and illustrate in a simple example, that the qualitative predictions of
the model are in line with those emerging in the empirical evidence. Indeed, asymmetric infor-
mation and financial imperfections explain why entrepreneurs might find individually optimal to
adopt the financial hierarchy found in the data. Potentially successful innovators might find more
convenient (or simply be forced to rely more) on cash-flow and equity financing than on debt fi-
nancing; this seems to be especially true for young start-up firms. Firms’ financial policy matters
for production and innovation decisions. This explains also why financial frictions might reduce
the capacity of individual decisions, such as R&D expenditure, to signal entrepreneurial abilities,
making the asymmetric information a severer, persistent problem.
Our paper has some features in common with the Shumpeterian growth literature. The econ-
omy proposed has an OLG structure and entrepreneurs with different skills or abilities face credit
constraints, similarly to Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006). However, differently from them,
and similarly to Aghion and Howitt (1992) and to all the related literature (e.g. see Aghion and
Howitt, 2005), we assume that the probability to achieve a successful innovation increases in the en-
trepreneur R&D expenditure/effort and ability. The closest, in spirit, to our entrepreneurial model
is the one sketched by Greenwald and Stiglitz’s (1990) and, more generally, individual models of
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moral hazard. Finally, differently from all the earlier growth literature, we propose a richer financial
structure: besides loans and internal finance, which are considered in Acemoglu et al. (2006), we
assume that firms can also enter in equity contracts, which we represent as competitive ‘venture
capital’ funds or ‘pools’. The use of ‘pool’ securities in competitive economies links our model
to the literature on general equilibrium economies with asymmetric information (e.g. see Dubey
Geanakoplos and Shubik, 2005, and, for production economies, Dre`ze, Minelli and Tirelli, 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy and defines an equilibrium
concept. Section 3 presents a simple example that is used to illustrate how asymmetric information
and financial frictions can distort firms’ financial and investment decisions in a way that is in line
with the empirical evidence mentioned above. Section 4 considers large economies (i.e. economies
with a large number of entrepreneurs of each type) and establishes equilibrium existence.
2. The economy and equilibrium
2.1. Time, individual characteristics and technology. Let us start with a general descrip-
tion of the economy. The economy is one with: a single commodity, also serving as production
capital; infinite time periods T = (0, 1, ..., t, ..); and overlapping generations of individuals and
R&D projects. Every generation t is formed by a finite number of types.2 Individuals are either
entrepreneurs or households. For the entrepreneurs, the OLG structure aims at capturing the two
stages of a R&D project; in the first period of life, young-age, an entrepreneur engages into a re-
search activity and in the next period, old age, the outcome of this activity realizes. Entrepreneurs
are indexed by i in E = (1, 2, .., I). Every entrepreneur i, born in date t, is characterized by her
ability to innovate ρit, we shall define later, an initial endowment of the commodity (e
i
t, e
i
t+1) and
identical risk-neutral preferences on her old-age consumption. Households are indexed by h in
H = (1, 2, ...,H). Every household h is endowed with (eht , eht+1) units of the commodity and has
identical preferences, possibly, exhibiting risk aversion.
Each entrepreneur manages a single firm whose technology is represented by a neoclassical pro-
duction function. At all dates t, given a capital input kt and factor productivity At, production
output is,3
yt = f(At, kt).
Technologies evolve only due to changes of total factor productivity (At+s)s∈T , where we assume
that At is non-decreasing over time and its growth rate is either zero or η − 1 > 0. In other words,
our economy is one in which technological innovation follows a quality ladder growth model with
At representing the frontier technology at t, and a technology increment, an innovation, is a step
of height η,
At+1 =
{
ηAt, when an innovation occurs
At, otherwise
We further assume that an innovation, when it occurs, is granted of a perfectly enforceable
patent, which has a finite life, we assume 1 period. Patents can be licensed. We assume that each
2A similar overlapping-generations framework is used, for example, by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006),
and by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004). There, entrepreneurs types are interpreted as dynasties.
3Without loss of generality, we assume that the commodity (hence capital) depreciates completely in every period.
Thus, the amount of individual capital kt equals individual investment.
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entrepreneur decides on the technological adoption when young, either purchasing a license to use
the patented, frontier technology or freely accessing to the pre-existing one. We label as mature
(and index it by ι = 1) the firms that hold a license and as start-up those that start behind the
frontier and try to innovate. Thus, although the total number I of entrepreneur types is assumed
to be constant over time, its distribution between firms (or technologies) is endogenous. For later
use, we denote by nt the number of patent licenses (i.e. mature firms) at date t; accordingly, we
index the set of entrepreneurs running the two firm-types in t, respectively, by ι = 1 and ι = 0, so
that E splits into two subset E ι, for ι = 0, 1. The time subscript t used for the type-set, Et and Ht
serves to indicate that agents refer to a particular generation t.
A third type of agents in the economy is ‘financial intermediaries’. These individuals are profit
maximizing, risk neutral agents who intermediate funds between consumers and firms. Their role
will be better understood once we describe the uncertainty and information characterizing the
economy.
2.2. Uncertainty. For simplicity, the only source of uncertainty is technological innovation.4 Thus,
we respectively denote by S and U the aggregate states in which an innovation either does occur or
it does not and describe a history of technological change in t by At = (A0, .., At).
Technological innovation, when it occurs, is the outcome of a sigle entrepreneur’s research and
development (R&D) activity. Each entrepreneur, who invests in a R&D activity when young,
might either be successful s or unsuccessful u in her old-age. These events define two possible
idiosyncratic states. Accordingly, at every date t, economic uncertainty can be described by I + 1
mutually exclusive states of the world,
ξu = (u, u, ...., u) , ξi = (u, .., s︸︷︷︸
ith
, u.., u), i ∈ E
where ξu corresponds to the event in which all entrepreneurs fail to innovate, and so does the
economy as a whole; while, ξi, in E , corresponds to the event that entrepreneur i innovates, and so
does the economy as a whole. The resulting state-space is denoted by Ξ; U ≡ {ξu} and S ≡ ξs ∈
Ξ \ {ξu}.
2.3. Information. All individuals know the objective probability ρt that a technological innovation
occurs at time t + 1. Hence, at all t, they compute the economy expected growth of technological
progress as,
Et
At+1
At
= ρtη + (1− ρt) = ρt(η − 1) + 1
This is exactly equal to η if an innovation occurs almost surely and is equal to one (i.e. no growth)
if the probability ρt equals zero. Individuals observe the outcome of innovation.
Our economy is one with private information too: i) the entrepreneur type i, which is charac-
terized by a probability to innovate ρi, is private information, and ii) investment in innovation xit
(the firm knowledge base capital), is carried out by a young entrepreneur i after she has traded in
all markets open at t. Instead, all the other characteristics of the economy (including the type of
technology used by each firm) are common knowledge.
4As in a stochastic quality ladder growth model, in every period t, given a frontier technology At, the next period
frontier At+1 is regarded as a binary random variable taking values, ηAt if an innovation occurs and At otherwise.
6
In our private-information economy, each entrepreneur i, when young, faces a partition of Ξ,
Ωi =
{{ξu}, {ξi}, {ξ−i}}
where, ξ−i is any state in which an innovation occurred thanks to an entrepreneur different from
i. In words, Ωi contains the no-innovation state ξu, the personal success state ξi, the innovation of
some competitor firm.
Instead, each household h observes the realizations of the aggregate states only. Accordingly,
her information partition is,
Φ = {{U}, {S}} ≡ {{ξu}, {(ξi)i∈E}}
of typical element φ.
Finally, for every entrepreneur i, joint probabilities are defined by P it : Ω
i → [0, 1], and for every
consumer h, by Pt : Φ→ [0, 1] as follows,5
P it (ξ
i) = ρit, P
i
t (ξ
s) =
∑
i∈E
ρit ≡ ρt = Pt(S), P it (ξu) = 1− ρt = Pt(U).
To simplify notation, we shall later use EitX to denote the expected value of X (a random variable
with domain Ξ) computed by entrepreneur i according to P it ; and simply EtX when X is measured
with respect to Pt. Analogously, we define conditional moments.
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As for intermediaries, they are essentially monitoring entities. We shall distinguish between
two types of intermediaries, equity-funds and banks, characterized by different information and
monitoring technologies. In particular, similarly to what happens in reality, we assume that equity-
funds can verify, at no cost, profit realizations on the individual firms with whom they contract.
While banks can only exercise a costly monitoring on profits.
2.4. Markets. Since individuals do only trade contracts whose payout is contingent on states that
they can verify, the economy has four markets in every period: a spot commodity market, an equity
market, a loan/debt market and a market for patent licenses. Except for the patent market, which
operates as a monopoly, all the others are perfectly competitive.
Patent licenses. A patent is awarded to the entrepreneur who innovates first: individual i in state
ξi. The patent holder in t becomes a monopolists and can eventually license the patent by offering
licenses to other entrepreneurs at some price pt. Licenses are standardized and allow the buyers to
exploit the technology in full. In t + 1 the patent expires and the associated technology becomes
5The time subscript t attached to P it aims to capture the fact that entrepreneur i is young in t and operates with
a success probability ρit.
6 In particular, consider a r.v. Xi with domain Ξ, measurable with respect to (P it )i. Keep in mind that (P
i
t )i are
joint probability distributions of all states ξ (i.e., in this setting, of both idiosyncratic and aggregate states). Then,
the following definitions are standard.
Eit[Xi] ≡
∑
j
P it (ξ
j)Xi(ξj), Eit[Xi|S] ≡ Eit[Xi|ξs] =
1
Pt(S)
∑
j 6=0
P it (ξ
j)Xi(ξj)
Similarly, Eit[Xi|U ] = P it (ξu)Xi(ξu)/Pt(U) = Xi(ξu). It will be useful to remember that if Xi has domain Φ (i.e.
it varies across aggregate states only), Eit[Xi|φ] = Xi(φ).
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freely accessible to all current producers. This essentially makes the innovation a perfectly non-rival,
club good supplied by a monopolist in a market where the demand side is perfectly competitive.
Equities. The informational structure of the economy and, in particular, the fact that households
can only verify aggregate states, motivates our assumption that individual firms’ equities are not
directly traded, but can only be sold as a ‘pool’, by private equity funds.7
Equity funds have an OLG structure too. Each one is linked to a generation of entrepreneurs’
investment projects and lasts for two periods. Therefore, at every date, a new generation of funds
appears in the economy, to serve currently young entrepreneurs, and an old one liquidates.
An entrepreneur i, who is young in t, might enter on an equity-contract by selling at a competitive
market price qt any share 0 ≤ ζit ≤ ζ̂ of her firm’s operating profits (piit, piit+1) to an intermediary.
The intermediary participation to young-age profits is granted by the fact that he observes piit and
entails a contribution to firm i costs in the same proportion. In the old age, when uncertainty
realizes, the intermediary monitors and, eventually, seize profit realizations piit+1. This occurs for
all entrepreneurs i who contract with an intermediary and for all intermediaries.
On the other side of the equity market, intermediaries sell to the households claims on the return
to the fund at the market price qt. The return is a ‘pool’ of profits from equity financing and consists
of a current payoff Πbt and a future one, Π
a
t+1, which is contingent to aggregate states in Φ.
8 The
exact definition of Πbt and Π
a
t+1 is postponed to section 2.6.3.
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Loans. At all t, a loan l is an exclusive, linear contract characterized by a sure gross rate of return
and a quantitative debt limit, a positive pair (Rlt+1, B
l
t). Loan contracts are offered by competing,
risk neutral intermediaries (e.g. banks) who contextually collect deposits. Every young entrepreneur
i in t can subscribe a (unique) loan contract l, issuing debt bit < 0 up to the limit −Blt, for the
promise to pay a sure, gross rate of return Rlt+1. Whenever b
i
t > 0 we say that i is subscribing a
bank deposit. In the following period, in case the entrepreneur defaults on her loan obligations,
she is monitored by the intermediary and her assets/income are sized. This intends to capture the
idea that bank monitoring is costly and is only carried out when an entrepreneur fails to honor her
contract.
2.5. Assumptions. The technology is represented by a standard production function.
Assumption 1 (Production technology).
The function f : R2+ → R+, such that y = f(A, k) is twice continuously differentiable, increasing
and concave in k and increasing in A; moreover, it satisfies, f(A, 0) = f(0, k) = 0, limk→0 ∂f/∂k >
1, limk→+∞ ∂f/∂k = 0.
7See, for example, Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005), Bisin and Gottardi (1999) and Lisboa (2001). For
production economies and other references, see Dre`ze, Minelli and Tirelli (2008).
8The superscript b and a, respectively, stand for before and after.
9An alternative specification is to assume that funds are indexed by the firms’ technology ι ∈ {0, 1}. However, this
does not add any particular insight, inasmuch firms profits and fund returns are collinear; in other words, inasmuch
the adding this distinction does not complete financial markets, allowing consumers to efficiently diversify aggregate
risk.
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Recall that the innovation ability of an entrepreneur i is defined as the probability she will
successfully innovate ρit. We assume that ρ
i
t = ρ
i(·, xit) is an increasing function of both type i’s,
intrinsic, innovation ability i, and her R&D investment/effort xit: for any level of R&D expenditure
x ≥ x′ and entrepreneur type i ≥ j, ρi(·, x) ≥ ρj(·, x) and ρi(·, x) ≥ ρi(·, x′); where these
hold with strict inequality, respectively, if i > j and x > x′. Moreover, we assume that ρit is
a decreasing function of the aggregate level of R&D expenditure and the technological frontier,
Xt = g(xt, At), where xt := (x
j)j∈Et and g is an aggregator function of xt. This aims to capture
a ‘fishing out’ effect; namely, the fact that economies with higher research activity and/or more
advanced technology require an higher individual R&D effort by the individual firm in order to
achieve an innovation (i.e. ρi is increasing in xi/X). Finally, for consistency, at all t,
(ρ) ρt =
∑
i∈Et
ρit ≤ 1
Therefore, the probability that the economy experiences a technological innovation Pt(S) equals the
mass of entrepreneurs who innovate, which must not exceed one. Again, the economy as a whole
might either be one in which an innovation occurs almost surely or not.
These properties are formally stated next, while the illustration of a parametrization of ρit is
presented in an example, in section 3 below (see also Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005).
Assumption 2 (Innovation probabilities).
At all dates t in T and for every entrepreneur i in Et, P it (ξi) = ρit, and ρit denotes the value of
ρi(xit, Xt), attained when x
i
t is entrepreneur i R&D expenditure and Xt ≥ xit > 0 is the indicator
of aggregate R&D in t. ρi : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] is a function that, with respect to the first argument,
is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfies ρit(0, ·) = 0; it
also satisfies, limxit/Xt→0 ∂ρ
i
t/∂x
i
t = +∞, limxit/Xt→+∞ ∂ρit/∂xit = 0. Finally, (ρit)i∈Et is such that
condition (ρ) holds.
Assumption 3 (R&D aggregator function).
For any given At, the aggregator g : [0, I] → [0, 1], such that Xt = g(xt, At) and xt := (xj)j∈Et , is
a function which is once continuously differentiable, non-decreasing, concave.
Each household’s preferences are defined on her old-age consumption, represented by a standard
expected utility function,
Assumption 4 (Households utility function).
U(ct+1) = Etu(ct+1)
where the function u : R+ → R is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
quasi-concave.
Finally, to ensure that individuals are ex-ant identical, we assume the following.
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Assumption 5 (Endowments).
Individuals have identical, positive endowments: ei = eJ ≥ 0 and eh = eH ≥ 0. Moreover, for all t
in T , (eJt , eJt+1) 6= 0, (eHt , eHt+1) 6= 0.
2.6. Decisions.
2.6.1. Entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur i who starts a production activity in t, essentially, faces four
decisions:
• technology adoption or decision about the firm type (At, At−1),
• R&D investment xit,
• production input in young- and old-age, (kit+s)s=0,1,
• financial policy, (ζit , bit).
In addition, a successful innovator is involved in patent license sales.
Conditional on the event that a technological innovation has occurred, a young entrepreneur at
t, starts by deciding on technology adoption, between At−1 and At = ηAt−1. The first technology
is patent-free, of type ι = 0; the second, ι = 1, requires to purchase a license at the market
price pt. Contextually, given a technology At+ι−1, the entrepreneur chooses a R&D expenditure
xit, production input (k
i
t) and decides on external financing, a equity-loan pair (ζ
i
t , b
i
t). Internal
financing, takes the form of firm cash flow,
yit = f(At+ι−1, k
i
t)− kit − xit(yy)
Hence, a young firm i has current operating profits,
(piy) pi
i
t = y
i
t − ptι
In her old-age, at t + 1, entrepreneur i observes the outcome of her R&D activity, as well as
the realization of aggregate risk. Then, conditionally on the state ξ, she makes her production
decisions, collects and make financial payments and (if ξ = ξi as occurred) sells patent licenses. In
the i’s old-age, cash flow and operating profits, respectively, are,
yit+1(ξ) =
(
f(At+1, k
i
t+1)− kit+1
)
(ξ), ξ ∈ Ξ(yo)
(pio) pi
i
t+1(ξ) = y
i
t+1(ξ) + pt+1nt+1(ξ), ξ ∈ Ξ
where pt+1nt+1(ξ) equals pt+1nt+1 if ξ = ξ
i and is zero otherwise.
We can now define entrepreneur i budget set corresponding to any technology ι. At market
prices p = (pt)t = (qt, pt, R
−1
t+1)t, borrowing limit B
ι
t , technology history A
t, the budget set of an
entrepreneur i in E ιt ,
Bi,ιt = Bi,ι
(
p, Bt, A
t, (piit+k)k=0,1
)
is the set of all possible (contingent) consumption levels cit+1 such that, at all ξ in Ξ,
cit+1(ξ) ≤ eit+1(ξ) +
(
1− ζit
)
piit+1(ξ) + b
i
tRt+1
at some financial policy (bit, ζ
i
t) and operating profits (pi
i
t, pi
i
t+1) satisfying,
−Bιt ≤ bit = eit +
(
1− ζit
)
piit + q
ι
tζ
i
t , 0 ≤ ζit ≤ ζ̂
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and (piy), (pio), for some choice, 0 ≤ xit, (kit+j)j∈{0,1}.10
The corresponding life-time expected, indirect-utility of a young entrepreneur i at t is,
V i,ιt = max
{
Eitcit+1 : (cit+1, xit, bit, ζit) ∈ Bi,ιt
}
and the entrepreneur (contingent) problem can be solved backwards, from old-age to young.
A successful entrepreneur, when old, sells patent licenses at the price pt+1 that maximizes sales
profits (i.e. revenue, sales costs being zero), for a given patent demand conjecture.11 The old
entrepreneur also decides on current production. Going backwards to young age, the entrepreneur
decides on current production and financing, so as to maximize expected future consumption on
her budget set, for given future realizations of firm profits and returns to innovation and patent
sales. This optimization is solved in t for all the available technologies ι. Finally, at t, a young age
entrepreneur i purchases a patent license and adopt a frontier technology, if and only if V i,1t ≥ V i,0t .
2.6.2. Households. Households manage their finances so has to maximize their expected utility of
old-age consumption. Having assumed that utility is monotonic, we let,
bht = e
h
t −
(
qt −Πbt
)
θht , θ
h
t ∈ R2+
and define h’s budget set Bht (p,Πbt ,Πat+1) as the set of contingent consumption levels satisfying,
cht+1(φ) ≤ eht+1(φ) +
[
eht −
(
qt −Πbt
)
θht
]
Rt+1 + θ
h
t Π
a
t+1(φ), φ ∈ Φ
at some fund-portfolio θht in R2+. The household’s indirect utility is
V ht = max
{
Etu
(
cht+1
)
: cht+1 ∈ Bht
}
The next subsection clarifies why, in our economy, households’ old-age consumption will only
vary across aggregate states, which are the only ones they can effectively verify.
2.6.3. Equity funds. For simplicity, we have assumed that funds are essentially monitoring enti-
ties, with an identical technology, facing no operating costs. Free accessibility to the monitoring
technology and free entry of intermediaries imply zero profits: each fund ‘passively’ balances state-
contingent revenues with costs, period by period. This implies that, without loss of generality, we
can assume that, in each period, a single equity fund is available for trade. More precisely, for
a representative fund, budget balance at the ‘before’ and ‘after’ investment stage is specified as
follows. When the fund (and firms) are young,
qt
∑
i∈Et
ζit + Π
b
t
∑
h∈H
θht = qt
∑
h∈H
θht +
∑
i∈Et
piitζ
i
t
At old age, the fund correctly assesses firms’ profits and form their conjecture on entrepreneur
types and actions based on the information collected at the contracting stage. Assuming that such
10Observe that outside investors, holding a fraction ζit of the firm are entitled to receive a proportional share of
operating profits and loan financing is represented by a negative value of bit.
11In the simplest case in which there is only one entrepreneur type, the monopolist will set the license price such
as to make young entrepreneurs indifferent between the two technologies. See section 3 below. The whole decision
process will have a precise definition in section 4.
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conjectures are correct (see remark 2.1 below), we have,
Πat+1(φ)
∑
h∈H
θht = ζ¯t
∑
i∈Et
(
ζit
ζ¯
Eit
[
piit+1(ξ
i)|φ])
where, for a precise definition of conditional probabilities we refer to footnote 6 above.
Next, assuming that the total number of claims sold by the firms are (strictly) positive and that
they balance with those subscribed by the households, ζ¯t =
∑
i∈Et ζ
i
t > 0 and θ¯t =
∑
h∈H θ
h
t , we
obtain,
Πbt ≡
1
ζ¯t
∑
i∈Et
ζitpi
i
t,(Π
b
t)
Πat+1(φ) ≡
1
ζ¯t
∑
i∈Et
(
ζitEit
[
piit+1(ξ
i)|φ]) , φ ∈ Φt(Πat+1)
which we assume to be sero if ζ¯t = 0.
We now argue that, in our simple economy, definition (Πat+1) simplifies considerably. First,
observe that firms’ profits are made of two components, the revenues eventually obtained by the
innovator firm from license sales pt+1nt+1, and the profits from the production activity yt+1. The
first component turns out to be independent of types and idiosyncratic states. In fact, i) the license
demand at t + 1 is independent of the realized idiosyncratic state and, ii) the patent winner at
t + 1 set pt+1 so as to extract the maximal revenue-surplus from current young firms, and this–
conditional on the aggregate state S– is independent of her type. The production component yt+1
is also independent of i, essentially, as a consequence of the assumption that patent expire after one
period; this implies that, a part from the innovator who jumps to At+1, all the other old-age produce
with an At−technology. As we shall illustrate in greater detail later, once a state realizes, the only
type-specific elements that enter Πat+1 are the individual participation/shares, (ζ
i
t/ζ¯t). Accordingly,
the fund payoff can be written in a more intuitive and simple notation as follows. Let ρ̂i ≡ (ζi/ζ¯)ρi,
and denote by pi(S) and pi(U), respectively, the level of profit achieved by an innovator firm and by
one who has failed to innovate. Then, equation (Πat+1) reads,
Πat+1(φ) =
{
ρ̂t
ρt
[pit+1(S)− pit+1(U)] + pit+1(U), if φ = S;
pit+1(U), if φ = U .
In words, if φ is a state of the economy S, in which some firm innovates, the fund payoff equals
a weighted sum of the the no innovation profit pit+1(U), plus the incremental profit due to the
innovation. This last innovation component is also weighted by the participation weights in the
fund (i.e. the terms ζit/ζ¯t in ρ̂t). Indeed, if all equity shares were the same, ρ̂t = ρt, and Π
a
t+1(S) =
pit+1(S). Otherwise, the return to the fund, when an innovation occurs, is increasing in the ‘quality’
of firms’ ventures, measured by Σi(ζ
i/ζ¯)ρi, which depends on entrepreneurs’ ability (ρi), on their
effort (xi) and on the participation weights in the fund.
Remark 2.1. (Incentive compatibility) We point out that the intermediary knows that equity con-
tracts are ex-ante incentive compatible and ex-post enforceable. In fact, consider an entrepreneur
i in Et, who enters a contract (qt, piit, piit+1), by selling some share ζit to the fund. Ex-ante, i set
ζit > 0 only if this contract is individually optimal at qt. Ex-post, once uncertainty realizes, i has
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no other choice than delivering the realization of piit+1, as the fund always detects miss-reported
profits. Notice that, even if the fund observed R&D investment xit, this would not be enough to
correctly identify i’s intrinsic ability ( i.e. to recover her probability distribution P i). However,
due to the ex-post monitoring on profits, entrepreneurs have no incentive to misreport their true
type, provided the equity price qt is anonymous. Indeed, suppose for a moment that, based on the
observation of R&D expenditure and the supply of equity, a fund decides to offer different equity
prices (.., qi, ..), conditional upon the type reported by the entrepreneur at the contracting stage.
Then, every entrepreneur would have an incentive to claim to be the type for whom intermediaries
require the lowest interest rate; that is, for given profits, the highest price, q¯ ≡ maxi(.., qi, ..). This
is particularly true in our context, in which (old-age) profits are independent of entrepreneur types.
Therefore, the only incentive-compatible contract (of the linear type considered here) is one with a
uniform price (i.e. type-independent).
2.6.4. Banks. We argue that, in this context, it is reasonable to assume that banks compete to
offer standard debt contracts, in sense of Gale and Hellwig (1985), which are also characterized by
debt limits. We assume that banks monitor entrepreneurs who default and size their income. Such
punishment implies that no entrepreneur finds optimal to implement strategic default; since this,
yielding zero old-age wealth and consumption, is dominated by the decision not to set up any firm
to begin with.
Even ruling out strategic default, entrepreneurs might fail to repay due to insufficient funds,
in unsuccessful states.12 This implies that default by i is observed in state (ξ−i) if and only
if, (1 − ζit)piit+1(ξ−i) < −bitRt+1, suggesting, for every i in Et and any ι in {0, 1}, a debt limit
Bit = (1− ζit)pit+1(U)/Rt+1, where pit+1 is independent of i for reasons we have explained above.
Are loans contracts (Rt+1, B
i
t) default-proof for the lenders? To answer this, recall that types
are private information at the time of loan contracting. A lender knows the type distribution,
but cannot effectively detect types. Ex-post verification, based on output observability, does not
help the implementation of such contracts: at the contracting stage, an entrepreneur j might have
an incentive to misreport her type, claiming to be of type i, if she sees she would be borrowing
constrained at Bjt < B
i
t; at the repayment stage, as we have seen discussing equity-funds, profits
are anonymous and do only allow to separate a successful innovator from all its unsuccessful com-
petitors. Therefore, the only linear debt-contracts which guarantee full repayment are those with
an anonymous debt limit, with ζit replaced by maxi ζ
i
t . Yet, for simplicity, we assume the form,
(Bt) Bt = (1− ζ̂)pit+1(U)
Rt+1
Observe that, as debt repayment coincides with the firm liquidation, other mechanisms based on
reputation, such as market exclusion, are unfeasible.
Suppose that, at all t, loan contracts (Rt+1, Bt, ) are supplied competitively by intermediaries
who finance themselves by collecting funds from savers at the interest rate Rt+1. Then, it is
straightforward to verify that market clearing on loans yields zero profits to the intermediaries.
12Indeed, to have a strictly positive, expected return from entrepreneurship, it must be that in the successful
state every firm has no advantage to default: for any entrepreneur i of generation t, (1− ζit)piit+1(ξ−i) ≥ −bitRt+1.
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2.7. Analyzing individual decisions. A complete characterization of individual decisions is de-
ferred to section 4. Here we only focus on those optimality conditions which have a clear economic
interpretation and will help understanding some salient, qualitative predictions that our economy
may deliver.
Entrepreneurs’ decisions. For any entrepreneur i in Et,
((cit+1, k
i
t+j)j∈{0,1}, x
i
t)
is an interior individual optimum, with respect to capital inputs, at financial decisions 0 ≤ ζit ≤ ζ̂,
bit ≥ −Bt, if and only if it satisfy, at all ξ in Ξ,
[young-age]
∂ρit
∂xit
[
piit+1(ξ
i)− piit+1(ξu)
] ≥ Rt+1, with equality if bit > −Bt(∗)
At+ι−1fk,t = 1
[old-age] cit+1(ξ) = e
i
t+1(ξ) +
(
1− ζit
)
piit+1(ξ) + b
i
tRt+1,(∗∗)
Aιt+1(ξ)fk,t+1(ξ) = 1
The timing of actions explains production decisions. Working backwards from t+1, after the state
ξ has realized, entrepreneur i in Et decides production inputs and, if ξ = ξi, she also decides patent-
license sales. ‘Production’ decisions are equivalent to those of a (static) standard neoclassical firm
(see the second line of (∗) and of (∗∗)). Under our assumptions, the solution to production decisions
is unique and yields continuous functions of input-demand and profits. Moreover, for all 0 ≤ ζit ≤ ζ̂,
debt repayment is feasible and individually rational, according to (Bt) above: productivity inaction
is always feasible, piit+1 ≥ 0, by individual rationality (cit+1 ≥ 0), (1 − ζit)piit+1(ξu) + eit+1(ξu) ≥
Rt+1Bt.
At young age t, given prices and future profits, all other decisions can be determined. First,
considering the first line of (∗), R&D expenditure is chosen so that marginal benefits are above
marginal costs (equal if the entrepreneur is financially unconstrained); where marginal benefits
equal the expected increase in profits due to an improvement of the innovation probability,13
ρixit
[
piit+1(ξ
u)− piit+1(ξ−i)
]
while marginal costs are the actualized value of investing into the safe asset Rt+1. Second, firm’s
financial policy is also driven by very simple considerations. The budget constraint is,
−Bt ≤ bit = eit +
(
1− ζit
)
piit + qtζ
i
t − xit
Thus, if at t firm’s cash flow piit and personal income e
i
t are insufficient to cover expenditure, k
i
t+x
i
t,
the entrepreneur has to demand outside finance. The optimal loan-equity mixed depends on the
13Here one should bear in mind that an entrepreneur who does not innovate attains a profit pi(U), no matter
what the others do. In fact piit+1(ξ
−i) = piit+1(ξ
u) = f(At, k∗)− k∗; which is due to the fact that any patent on At
(if it existed!) expires in t+ 1, making At the only rational technological choice of old-age entrepreneurs.
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relative cost of the two instruments. Equity financing is cheaper than loan if it promises a lower
expected return,
Eitpiit+1
qt + piit
< Rt+1
in which case firm i sells the maximum feasible amount of equities, ζ̂. Observe that this tends to
happen for agents who have a relatively low expected return from entrepreneurship, either because
they are of low-ability or because they have chosen to invest relatively little in R&D. Though, things
are not so trivially predictable; it is also possible that
Eitpiit+1
qt + piit
> Rt+1
and still the entrepreneur sells equities, even up to ζ̂, because she is borrowing constrained (γit
sufficiently high in (ζ)). Hence, one might still observe a promising young entrepreneur entering
equity financing, just because banks are not offering her enough credit. This, obviously, makes
financial decisions a weak signal of entrepreneurs’ ability and R&D effort.
Summarizing, ζit is the value of,
(ζ) ζit(p, nt+1, Bt, A
t) =

ζ̂, if
Eitpiit+1
qt+piit
≤ Rt+1 + γit ;[
0, ζ̂
]
, if
Eitpiit+1
qt+piit
= Rt+1 + γ
i
t ;
0, otherwise
where γit ≥ 0 is the multiplier of the borrowing constraint, which is zero if bit > −Bt
Households’ decisions. For a typical household h, let the individual stochastic discount factor be
∇ht+1. Then, (cht , bht , θht ) is individually optimal if only if,
Rt+1 ≥
Et∇ht+1Πat+1
qt −Πbt
,
with equality if θht > 0,
bht = e
h
t −
(
qt −Πbt
)
θht
and
cht+1 = e
h
t+1 + b
h
tRt+1 + θ
h
t Π
a
t+1
is the state-contingent, consumption profile. Clearly, ∇ht+1 equals the gradient of the expected
utility at cht+1.
2.8. Equilibrium. We identify an economy by,
E = (E ,H, A0, η, f, ζ̂, (ρi, ei)i∈E , g, (uh, eh)h∈H)
where, it is understood that, f, ρi, g, uh are functions.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium of an economy E is a sequence of measurable functions
of allocations and prices(
(cit+1, (y
i
t+k)k=0,1, x
i
t, ζ
i
t , b
i
t)i∈Et , ((c
h
t+k)k=0,1, b
h
t , θ
h
t )h∈H
)
t∈T , p = (qt, pt, R
−1
t+1)t∈T ,
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returns from equity-funds (Πat ,Π
a
t+1)t∈T , number of licenses sold (nt)t∈T , debt limits ((Bt)t∈T )ι∈{0,1}
and technological progress (At)t∈T , such that, at all dates t and state φ in Φ,
(1) all entrepreneurs i in I and households h in H solve their optimal decision problems at(
p, At, Bt, (e
i
t+k)k=0,1
)
, Xt and (Π
b
t ,Π
a
t+1);
(2) equity market clears,
∑
h∈H θ
h
t −
∑
i∈E ζ
i
t = 0;
(3) loan market clears,
∑
h∈H b
h
t +
∑
i∈Et b
i
t = 0;
(4) returns from equity-funds are defined according to (Πbt), (Π
a
t+1);
(5) pt solves the monopoly problem and nt is the number of license sales at pt;
(6) debt limits are determined according to (Bt);
(7) Xt = g(xt, At).
It can be easily verified that, for all generation t, an equilibrium of definition 1 satisfies a com-
modity market clearing in expectation. This suggests we could have presented an equilibrium
definition in which item (4) is substituted by a requirement on the commodity market clearing.
This is common in the general-equilibrium literature with asymmetric information, at least since
Helpman and Laffont (1973) and has the ‘advantage’ to avoid the need to explicitly define interme-
diaries and their actions (e.g., see Bisin et al. (2011), Lisboa (2001), Bisin and Gottardi (1999) and
the references therein). However, this simplification tends to ‘hide’ the type of information require-
ments and institutions that would be actually needed to implement the corresponding equilibrium
outcomes. To clarify this issue we add the following remark.
Remark 2.2 (The exact form of commodity market clearing). The type of market clearing condition
implied by definition 1 is one in which the commodity market clears in expectations, computed with
respect to the finest information partition (i.e. the join of (Ωi)i). This is equivalent to require
that the commodity-market-auctioneer has a (point-) expectation on types and, precisely, on (ρit)i,
which turns out to be exact, at equilibrium. Hence, for a type i in Et, the auctioneer takes the
expectation of each variable with domain Ξ using the information (Ωi)i at that point in time, as in
footnote 6. In fact, by doing this along i’s old-age budget constraint one finds, for each aggregate
state φ, Eit[cit+1|φ] = Eit[eit+1|φ] + (1 − ζit)Eit[piit+1|φ] + bitRt+1. Hence, aggregating across old-age
entrepreneurs i of generation t and using (4), one obtains,
c¯tt+1 − e¯tt+1 − y¯tt+1 − pt+1nt+1 = 0
where the time-superscript indexes the t−generation, y¯tt+1 = ytt+1(S)+(J−1)ytt+1(U) is the aggregate
(expected) net-output produced by generation t in t+1, and pt+1nt+1 is the revenue from license sales
that the innovator monopolist of generation t collects from the (t+1)−young (i.e. the entrepreneurs
i in Et+1 who establish a mature firm). Finally, at equilibrium, the term pt+1nt+1 can be computed
by a simple aggregation of the budget constraints of all agents, households and entrepreneurs, who
are young in t+ 1. This, by (4), yields,
pt+1nt+1 = x¯t+1 − e¯t+1t+1
Therefore, upon substitution,
c¯t+1 − e¯t+1 − y¯t+1 = 0
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where e¯t+1 = e¯
t
t+1 + e¯
t+1
t+1 is the aggregate endowment at t + 1 and y¯t+1, similarly defined, is the
net-output produced in t+ 1.14
To summarize, we have shown that an equilibrium in definition 1 is also an equilibrium in which
(4) is substituted by the assumption that the commodity market clears in expectations. The reverse
is straightforward.
3. A simple example
In this section, we present a simplified version of our economy and discuss some of its possible
balanced-growth equilibrium outcomes, also by mean of a numerical example.
The economy is one with only two entrepreneurs E = {1, 2}, and a single household H = {h}.
All individuals are endowed with a certain amount of commodity when young, defined by e =
((e1t , e
2
t ), e
h
t )t such that, at all t, et = η
te0 > 0.
We also start by focusing on the case of no-aggregate uncertainty, Ξ = {ξ1, ξ2}. Precisely, we
parameterize the aggregator function g such that Xt = g(xt, 1) ≡ λ1(x1t )β + λ2(x2t )β , and assume
that the probability distributions are as follows: for every entrepreneur i, who conjectures Xt > 0,
the success probability is,
(ρi) ρi(xit, Xt) =
λi(xit)
β
Xt
, 0 < β < 1;
where the parameters 0 < λ1 < λ2 < 1 capture entrepreneurial abilities. The production technology
is Cobb-Douglas; at all t, given input kt and frontier technology At = η
tA0, commodity output is,
f(At, kt) = A
1−α
t k
α
t , 0 < α < 1.
Since we focus on balanced growth equilibria, for simplicity and whenever it causes no confusion,
we drop the time-subscript, indicate with A the frontier technology of the current young, and with
ηA the next period frontier. We also indicate with subscripts y and o, respectively, young and old
agents.
Information and markets are as in the general economy. Old-age individual profits are, pio =
(pio(S), pio(U)). There is a single equity-fund, which is traded at price q and whose payoffs are,
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Πb =
1
ζ¯t
∑
i
piiyζ
i, Πa = ρ̂t∆pio + pio(U)
where ∆pio = pio(S)− pio(U) and ρ̂t =
∑
i ρ
i(ζi/ζ¯).
3.1. Individual decisions. Entrepreneurs decision process can be solved backwards, from old- to
young-age, as we now illustrate.
14To be precise, notice that, y¯t+1 = y¯tt+1+y¯
t+1
t+1 , where y¯
t+1
t+1 is the simple aggregation of y
i
t+1 = ft+1−kit+1−xit+1
over Et+1 (see equation (yy) above).
15Recall that, in this example economy, an innovation occurs with probability ρt = 1, at all dates t.
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For any technological adoption ι and current licence price p, entrepreneur i optimal cash flow
(yiy, y
i
o) are defined as follows,
yy,ι = max
ky≥0
[(ηιA)1−αkαy − ky − x] =
1− α
α
ky,ι − x, ky,ι = ηιAα 11−α
yo(U) = max
ko(U)≥0
[(ηA)1−α(ko(U))α − ko(U)] = 1− α
α
ko(U), ko(U) = ηky,0
yo(S) = max
ko(S)≥0
[(η2A)1−α(ko(S))α − ko(S)] = 1− α
α
ηko(U), ko(S) = η
2ky,0
Accordingly, operating profits pi can also be specified so as to account for differences across the
firm’s technology ι managed by young entrepreneurs (i.e. those for whom a patent protection is
effective). Old-age, profits pio are independent of types and technologies, but are state-contingent,
also due to the uncertain reward from innovation (p′(S), p′(U)) = (p′, 0):
piiy = yy,ι − pι, piio(φ) = yo(φ) + p′(φ), φ ∈ {S,U}
Next, we observe that, conditional of having innovated, each old entrepreneur acts as a monopolist
and fix the patent price p′ so as to fully extracts the cash-flow-rent of the current young. Here, this
occurs by setting p′ = η(η− 1)y0y = ηp; implying that the licence price steadily grows at the rate of
technological progress η. To see why this is so, first, notice that, for a symmetric R&D expenditure,
x = xi = x−i, the high-ability entrepreneur 2 has the highest success probability (ρi), implying the
highest expected reward from innovation,
λ2
λ1 + λ2
× ∆pio
x
This also reveals that the only, exogenous, source of firms’ heterogeneity is the ability λi, while
technological adoption does not affect innovation decisions. Indeed, the choice of purchasing a
patent license and initiate a mature firm gives to the entrepreneur a productivity advantage in her
young-age only (i.e., as long as the patent lasts); that is, gross of patent cost, a mature firm has
higher cash-flow only at the time in which the investment decision takes place. However, knowing
this, the current monopolist sets the license price p so as to extract all the technological rent; thus,
at equilibrium, entrepreneurs are indifferent between setting up a start-up or a mature firm (i.e. p
implies that piy = pio).
This all description yields the following young-age budget constraint,
(b.c.y) −Bi ≤ bi = ei + (q − piy)ζi
and contingent, consumption profile,
(b.c.o) c
i(ξ) = (1− ζi)pio(ξ) +Rbi, ξ ∈ Ξ
Therefore, going backwards, a young entrepreneur i solves,
V iι = max
(xi,bi,ζi)
(1− ζi) [ρi(xi)pio(S) + (1− ρi(xi))pio(U)]+Rbiι
subject to (b.c.y) and a limit on equity issue 0 ≤ ζi ≤ ζ̂ ≤ 1.
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The households problem can be solved in a similar way. It is simpler, in this economy, as
households bear no risk.
3.2. A balanced growth equilibrium. We conjecture that the economy has a balanced growth
equilibrium, with: physical capital, R&D expenditure, output, consumption, loan/deposit positions
and debt limits growing at the gross-rate of technological progress η; p and q growing at η; a constant
interest rate on bank loans R, constant equity positions ζi and stationary innovation probabilities
ρi. Our conjecture can be easily verified, by tedious computations, which we omit. Instead, what
we think it is interesting to highlight here is the sort of financial structure that might emerge at
equilibrium. Thus, in the rest of this section, we are going to illustrate, also through a parametric
example, that a ‘balanced growth’ equilibrium can have the following features:
(1) The high-ability entrepreneur 2 chooses to initiate a start-up firm and the low-ability 1
purchases a patent license;
(2) the start-up finances R&D using all the available cash-flow and loanable funds; however,
being short of cash and borrowing-constrained, entrepreneur 2 opts for an ‘inefficiently high’
share of equity financing;
(3) the low-ability entrepreneur 1, running the mature firm, saves almost all her young-age
cash-flow in the bank deposit and invests only a limited amount in R&D;
(4) in the aggregate, credit frictions imply an under-investment in R&D by the high-ability
entrepreneur, who is running a startup;
(5) both firms issue equities to the fund, whose shares are purchased by the consumer.
Moreover, at equilibrium, expected returns faced by a young entrepreneur have the following
structure,
Exp.return to invest in firm 1 < R ≤ Πa
q−Πb < Exp.return to invest in firm 2
This clearly entails an inefficient allocation of capital across ventures. In an economy with no
capital-markets segmentation and financial restrictions, this return structure would create arbitrage
opportunities; as a result, capital would flow across firms (from the low-ability 1 to the high-ability
2) and across markets, so as to equalize their returns with R. Thus, with respect to this efficient
benchmark, there is an under-investment of R&D in the start-up firm, run by the high-ability
entrepreneur and an over-investment in the firm run by the low-ability entrepreneur.
More formally, this equilibrium outcome simply follows by the property that the success proba-
bility (ρi) is strictly concave in the relative, innovation expenditure xi/X. An individual innovation
decision xi is optimal if and only if,
ρixi∆pio ≥ R
holding with equality if i′s borrowing constraint is non-binding. Solving, under our simple param-
eterization, one finds,
xi =
(
λiβ
X
× ∆pio
R+ γi
) 1
1−β
, X :=
∑
j
λj(xj)β
with γi denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint of i. Clearly, al-
though higher ability entrepreneurs are more prone to innovate, their debt limits might increase
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investment cost (measured by γ2), resulting in an under-investment in R&D. Precisely, R&D ex-
penditure satisfies x2 ≥ x1 if and only if,
λ2
λ1
≥ 1 + γ
2
R
;
in words, the high-ability entrepreneur invests more than the low-ability if and only if the cost of
the financial friction she faces is ‘small’ relative to her ability advantage.
As for financial decisions, the return structure is one indicating that the high-ability, potentially
more innovative entrepreneur, faces higher expected returns. This implies that, in absence of
financial constraints, she would rather use the loan instead of equities. However, as financial
constraints start binding, entrepreneur 2 opts to increase equity financing, selling shares of her
firm to the fund. In contrast, the low-ability entrepreneur 1 is one that prefers to sell equities and
save into a bank deposit (i.e. withholds funds from real investments and allocate them to purely
financial ones). This behavior is still desirable, at equilibrium, since it allows to make funds flow
to the high-ability, helping to keep low the interest rate and to relax the borrowing limits.
In the following numerical exercise we derive an equilibrium with the property we have just
described, and compare its figures with those achieved at an equilibrium of an economy with
‘weaker’ financial frictions. This benchmark economy is such as firms’ equities are still pooled
into a fund but their financial decisions are left unrestricted (no limits on borrowing or on equity
issues are imposed). Hence, in the benchmark, asymmetric information between consumers and
entrepreneurs remains, although intermediaries are fully informed on entrepreneurs types and can
purchase equity contracts at firm-specific prices.
For an economy with the following fundamentals,(
A, (λ1, λ2), α, ζ̂, β, η, (e10, e
2
0, e
c
0)
)
= (1, (.25, .75), .35, .29, .85, 2.5, (.25, .25, .4))
the main equilibrium values are reported in Table 1.16 In both cases, license prices are determined
Table 1. Results
Variables x1 ζ1 b1 x2 ζ2 b2 θh bh R
Equilibrium .008 .19 .87 1.63 .04 - .87 .23 0 1.06
Benchmark .001 0 .62 1.64 0 - 1.01 0 .39 1.44
so as to make entrepreneurs indifferent with respect to the technology to adopt, and grow at the
rate of technological progress η (i.e. p′ = ηp).
The benchmark equilibrium is ‘efficient’ in the sense that it maximizes aggregate expected utili-
ties, given the information available to each individual and market structure. At this equilibrium,
returns to alternative investments and financial sources are equalized:17
Exp.return to invest in firm 1 = R = Exp.return to invest in firm 2
16The equilibrium algorithm is written in Mathematica and it is available on request.
17Here the fund price q is computed as q = 1
ζ1+ζ2
(q1ζ1 + q2ζ2).
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with the fund that is (voluntarily) not traded. This implies efficiency of both production and R&D
decisions: at equilibrium, capital freely flows across firms, so as to equate their expected returns
and the returns to investing in innovation.
Our numerical results illustrate features (1)-(4) at the beginning of this subsection. By going
from the equilibrium figures to the ‘efficient’ benchmark one immediately observes that the R&D
expenditure of the high-ability increases and that of the low-ability decreases. Financial decisions
are also revised as expected, with the high-ability that decreases the proportion of equity financing
over both the total outside financing and its own R&D expenditure, qζ/(qζ+ |b|) and qζ/x0, falling
to zero, respectively, from 9.6 percent and 5.7 percent. Also the low-ability entrepreneur, who is
exploiting her informational advantage to profit from selling equities, essentially, finds optimal not
to invest in the firm and to act as a saver rather than as an entrepreneur.
Again, weakening asymmetric information allows to implement an allocation in which savings are
allocated more efficiently because transferred, through the bond, to the high-ability entrepreneur.
This is possible essentially because i) it allows intermediaries to achieve a precise evaluation of equity
prices, which damages the low-ability, and ii) it increases the possibility of borrowing, which lowers
the cost of outside funds faced by the high type. As for the later, Figure 1 plots the supply (marginal
cost) schedule associated to debt financing. It closely resembles to the standard representation used
in the literature to explain financing hierarchy of entrepreneurs with market imperfections.18 Here,
the innovation expenditure, x, is measured on the horizontal axis and the marginal cost of debt is
reported on the vertical axis. The marginal cost perceived by an high-type entrepreneur 2 is equal
to the market interest rate R up to the expenditure level that makes her debt constraint binding,
then it increases according to the shadow marginal cost associated to her debt limit γ. The marginal
cost of cash-flow financing is the cheapest, being equal to one, at equilibrium. The marginal cost
of funding is measured by the marginal cost of using an extra unit of capital to produce output
divided by its marginal productivity: for a firm with technology ι ∈ {0, 1},
1
MPKι
=
1
α
×
(
ky,ι
ηιA
)1−α
It is important to remark that, while R is taken as given by each entrepreneur, economies in
which financial constraints are introduced, or simply become more severe, tend to be associated
to a fall in the equilibrium value of R. This equilibrium effect is also well understood and, in the
essence, it is the consequence of the fact that a fall in the loan demand has to be balanced by a
proportional fall of the (unconstrained) loan supply. In our economy a drop of R not only reduces
the entrepreneur’s cost of outside financing, but also relaxes her debt-limit; yet, this beneficial effect
does not eliminate the overall distortion produced on R&D investment and financing.
A final comment concerns the benchmark equilibrium. The fact that the high type prefers to
subscribe a debt contract and issues equities only when this is insufficient to fund investments, is
in line with the corporate finance literature. Debt contracts have very good incentive properties
under moral hazard, as their payment schedule is flat for every level of profit exceeding the fixed
18See Hubbard (1998) for the original discussion (in particular, see his figure 1 on p.196) and, for example,
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) for one focussing on R&D financing.
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Figure 1. Entrepreneur 2, debt supply schedule
debt cost (e.g., see Innes, 1990). This clearly creates an incentive for the entrepreneur who borrows
to maximize the probability of achieving high profit realizations (ρi in our setting).
3.3. An example with aggregate risk. Our previous simple economy can be slightly changed
to allow for aggregate risk, by adopting a different functional form for the innovation probability
ρi. For example, it suffices to consider,
ρi = λi
(
xi
X
)β
, 0 < β < 1, X = x1 + x2
for
∑
λi = 1 and 0 < λi < 1, for all i.
We can explore how financial frictions and innovation decisions affect expected growth at the
whole economy, without going through the whole exercise of computing equilibria. Recalling that
individual optimality implies,
ρixi =
R+ γi
∆pio
under our parameterization, we have that an equilibrium must satisfy,
xi
X
=
(
βλi
∆pio
R+ γi
) 1
1−β
This yields an economy innovation probability,
ρ =
∑
ρi =
∑
λi
(
xi
X
)β
=
∑
(λi)
1
1−β
(
β
∆pio
R+ γi
) β
1−β
Financial frictions (binding borrowing limits) tend to lower the expect growth rate, for given interest
rate R. As in our previous example, R adjusts downwards with credit restrictions, therefore the
equilibrium effect on ρ depends on the overall effects on the terms R+ γi.
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4. Equilibrium existence in large economies
We shall consider a version of our economy in which there still is a finite number of entrepreneur
types I, but there are a continuum of identical individuals of each type; without loss of generality,
we assume the space of each type of entrepreneurs to be the unit interval. This essentially allows
us to overcome a technical problem related to the non-convexity generated by the binary choice of
technological adoption. Hence it would not be needed if we had to simplify our setting to one in
which technologies are somehow assigned to each young entrepreneur. As we prove later, passing
to large economies makes each type aggregate demand for licenses a convex correspondence. The
economy becomes observationally equivalent to one with I entrepreneurs in which every i who is
young at t, decides the fraction of activity νi,ιt to carry out using a technology ι in {0, 1}. Yet, as
she does so, she will not be constrained to define an R&D activity and financial policy which splits
with the same proportions.
Accordingly, in this new economy aggregation has to be redefined and so has to be the equilib-
rium. For the latter it suffices to notice the following. Market clearing are now,∑
i∈Et
νitζ
i
t −
∑
h∈Ht
θht = 0,
∑
i∈Et
νitb
i
t +
∑
h∈Ht
bht = 0
Moreover, letting, ζ¯t =
∑
i∈Et ν
i
tζ
i
t , the fund-payoffs are,
Πbt ≡
1
ζ¯ιt
∑
i∈Et
νitζ
i
tpi
i
t,(Π
b
t)
Πat+1(φ) ≡
1
ζ¯ιt
∑
i∈Et
νit
(
ζitEit
[
piit+1(ξ
i)|φ]) , φ ∈ Φt(Πat+1)
4.1. Equilibrium existence.
Theorem 1. For every large economy E satisfying our assumptions an equilibrium exists.
Without loss of generality, we restrict to economies where at t = 0 there is no innovation, coming
form the unrepresented past, and with the available technology being accessible at no cost, p0 = 0.
The proof of this theorem is divided in two parts. In the first part, we prove the existence
of an equilibrium in a T−finite OLG economy, with a finite number of generations T . As an
immediate corollary, it follows that an equilibrium exists also in a T−truncated OLG economy ;
where a truncated economy is one in which assets and licenses can only be traded up to date T − 1
(not in T ) and spot markets are open up to T , but sequences of prices and allocations are defined
over the infinite horizon (see, for example, Levine, 1989). Finally, because the equilibrium set of
a T−truncated economy is also compact, the limit of such truncated equilibria exists and it is an
equilibrium of our original overlapping generation economy.
4.1.1. Equilibrium existence in a finite horizon OLG economy. It is worth spending a few more
words on the proof logic. Consider a T−finite economy; an OLG economy, as the one describes,
which ends with the T th generation. Time and uncertainty can have a tree representation, whose
nodes are defined with respect to aggregate states φ ∈ {S,U} occurring at each date. Denote by
Ps(φt) the unique predecessor node of φt at time s < t. Then, for any t ≥ 0 and node φst+1 = S
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we can construct a 2-period, 2-state economy populated by a single generation, with the same
characteristics as those assumed for the general economy, and aggregate uncertainty in the second
period characterized by a node φut+1 with the predecessor node φt = Pt(φst+1) = Pt(φut+1). This
one-generation economy is also characterized by a the fact that each entrepreneur, when old, has
a license demand-conjecture n(φt+1) that she can use to compute the monopoly profit from patent
sales, in the event she had successfully innovated.
Definition 2 (A one-generation economy E(φst+1)). Any node φ
s
t+1 and demand conjecture n(φ
s
t+1)
identifies a one-generation economy,
E(φst+1) = (A(φ
s
t+1)/η, η, f, u, ζ̂, (ρ
i)i∈E , g, (et, et+1), n(φst+1))
where t is used to index the date-event φt = P(φst+1) = P(φut+1) and the variables in t + 1 are
contingent to the states (φst+1, φ
u
t+1) = (S,U).
We now claim that we can obtain E(T ) as the union of 2
(
2T−1
) − 1 distinct, one-generation
economies,
(+) E(T ) =
K⋃
k=1
{
E(φst+1,k) : t = 0, .., T − 1
}
, K ≡ 2× 2T−1 − 1
Indeed, there are 2T−1 terminal nodes which correspond to innovation states, S. For each one of
these 2T−1 nodes, φsT,j in {φsT,1, ...φsT,2T−1}, take the history terminating with φsT,j . Along each of
these 2T−1 histories there are K distinct, one-generation economies. By patching these economies
one can give a tree-representation to E(T ). We do it for T = 2 in figure 4.1.1 below.
Definition 3 (Equilibrium of a one-generation economy E(φst+1)). An equilibrium of a one-generation
economy E(φst+1) is a profile of measurable allocations and prices,(
((yit+k)k=0,1, x
i
t, ζ
i
t , b
i
t, γ
i
t , n
i
t)i∈E , (Π
b
t ,Π
a
t+1), (c
h
t+1, b
h
t , θ
h
t )h∈H,pt = (qt, pt, pt+1, R
−1
t+1, Bt), Xt
)
such that,
(1) every individual i in I adopts her decisions optimally, at (pt, (Πt,Πt+1), At+1, Bt, et), Xt
and at the conjecture of license demand n(φst+1);
(2) the loan market clears,
∑
i∈Et ν
i
tb
i
t +
∑
h∈Ht b
h
t = 0;
(3) the equity market clears:
∑
i∈Et ν
i
tζ
i
t −
∑
h∈Ht θ
h
t = 0;
(4) the return to equity funds satisfies (Πbt), (Π
a
t+1);
(5) pt+1 solves the monopoly problem at the conjecture license-demand n(φ
s
t+1) and license sales
nt+1 are determined. pt solves the monopoly problem at the actual license-demand n(φt)
and license sales nt are determined.
(6) debt limit is Bt;
(7) Xt = g(xt, At+1/η).
Here, the only thing to notice is that an equilibrium of a one-generation economy E(φst+1) defines
the license demand correspondence of the generation when young, at t. Since the trade of patent-
licenses is the only form of trade occurring across generations, the later piece of information is the
only one we need to establishing equilibrium in a T−finite economy. To illustrate how this can be
done, consider the following procedure.
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Now, having in mind the representation in (+) and its corresponding tree (see figure 2), start at
the terminal node of the terminal history in which there has been an innovation in every predecessor
node (an history of full success at the aggregate level); call this node φsT,1. This identifies a one-
generation economy E(φsT,1) with a license demand conjecture of nT (φ
s
T,1) = 0. At the terminal
nodes (φsT,1, φ
u
T,1) (where φ
u
T is s.t. φ
s
T−1,1 = PT−1(φsT,1) = PT−1(φuT,1)), technologies are A(φsT,1) =
ηTA0 and A(φ
u
T,1) = η
T−1A0, respectively. Thus, profit functions can be computed. We point
out that the identity (or type) of the innovator entrepreneur in φsT,1 = S does not affect market
variables and, consequently, the other agents’ behaviors. Working backwards, at φsT−1,1 we can
define the individuals’ optimal decisions (including R&D and financial ones) as functions of prices
and fund payoffs only. Moreover, for the entrepreneurs, we can also compute the license demand
(the technology adoption correspondence) n(φsT−1). This is obtained observing that the decision is
between a costly technology A(φsT−1) ≡ A(φsT )/η and a freely available one, equal to A(φsT−1) ≡
A(φsT )/η
2 (the most productive among all the free technologies available). Finally, at every node
(φsT−1, φ
u
T−1) financial market prices can be derived so as to satisfy market clearing, which only
involve currently young individuals. Thus, an equilibrium for this one-generation economy can be
derived. Notice that this procedure is a backward induction one which is used to derive demand and
supply functions of prices and competitive prices that have to be determined by the ‘auctioneer’;
thus, finding an equilibrium of a one-generation economy involves a fixed-point argument. Next,
if, for example, T = 2 (as in figure 2), working backwards, we can consider the economy E(φsT−1)
equipped with a license-demand conjecture n(φsT−1), whose equilibrium we can compute as above.
We are now at the origin of the tree, φ0 in which the technology is free. It remains to reiterate
the two-step procedure just illustrated, by starting from the only other terminal node of type S,
φsT,2 = S. This defines an economy E(φ
s
T,2) of which we can compute the equilibrium. Clearly, this
reasoning extends to any finite T > 2.
We now provide a simpler (and yet more precise and general) definition of the equilibrium
algorithm for a T−finite economy.
Definition 4 (Iteration I(φ)). Given a T−finite economy E(T ), for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, an
iteration I(φst+1) starts at a node φ
s
t+1 = S, chosen such that there exists another node φ
u
t+1 with
common predecessor φt = Pt(φst+1) = Pt(φst+1). For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, iteration I(φst+1) identifies
a one-generation economy E(φst+1). The outcome of an iteration is an equilibrium of E(φ
s
t+1)
and a conjecture n(φt) corresponding to the license demand correspondence of its currently young
entrepreneurs; where, n(φ0) = 0.
Definition 5 (Equilibrium algorithm). The equilibrium algorithm over a T−finite economy E(T )
consists in performing the iterations (I(φst+1))0≤t≤T−1 with the following rules:
• For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, φst+1 = S and φst = P(φst+1), the conjecture n(φst ) in E(φst ) is the
outcome of I(φst+1);
• For all terminal nodes φsT = S, a conjecture n(φsT ) = 0 characterizes E(φsT );
• Iterations are performed backwards, starting at all the terminal nodes of type S.
The outcome of an application of the algorithm is an equilibrium of E(T ).
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Figure 2. E(2)
Having observed all this, the existence of an equilibrium of a T−finite economy E(T ) follows from
the existence of an equilibrium of E(φst+1), something we establish in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. An equilibrium of the economy E(φst+1) exists. Moreover, the equilibrium set is
compact.
Equilibrium existence of E(φst+1), essentially, follows from Debreu (1958), Radner (1972) and
(for an economy with equity funds) Dre`ze, Minelli and Tirelli (2008), opportunely extended to
our context. Thus, first, we artificially bound the economy, restricting real resources and asset
positions in a box of edge κ. Individuals’ real actions (c, y, k, x) are measurable, positive sequences,
which are uniformly bounded: at every date t, the t−element of the allocation sequence is assumed
to be contained in a cube of uniform edge κ > 0. An analogous assumption is introduced for
households’ financial actions (b, θ). Sκ denotes the intersection of a set S with a κ−cube of equal
dimension. Prices pt = (qt, pt, pt+1, R
−1
t+1) are restricted to be measurable, positive sequences which
are uniformly bounded, below by  > 0 and above by 1/; so that, at every date t, the t−element
of the each price sequence is contained in G := [0, 1/]. Similarly, for any entrepreneur i and every
date t, γit is restricted on G
. At t = 0, P,G, respectively, denote the set of al possible, bounded,
measurable sequences of prices and individual multipliers γ. Second, we prove that an equilibrium
of this box-T-economy exists. Finally, we show that, by taking κ and 1/ sufficiently large, the
latest is also an equilibrium of the original, T− finite economy.
26
Production and innovation choices. Consider any entrepreneur i in Et and, for notational simplicity,
drop the superscript i, unless necessary.19 Using her young-age budget constraint to substitute for
bt, we can write the entrepreneur maximum problem as,
max
(xt,(kt+j)j∈{0,1},ζt,γt)
J ι (xt, kt+1, ζt, bt, ·) = (1− ζt)Eitpit+1+(fP )
+
[(
f(At+ι−1, kt)− kt − xt − ptι+ eit
)
(1− ζt) + qtζt
]
(Rt+1 + γt) + γtBt;
such that (xt, (kt+j)j∈{0,1}) ∈ [0, κ]× R4+, 0 ≤ ζt ≤ ζ̂, γt ∈ G
Eitpit+1 := (1− ρt)pit+1(ξu) + ρitpit+1(ξi) +
(
ρt − ρit
)
pit+1(ξ
−i)
=
(
1− ρit
)
pit+1(ξ
u) + ρitpit+1(ξ
i)
and, according to (yo) and (pio), pit+1(ξ) =
[
f(Aιt+1, kt+1)− kt+1 + pt+1nt+1
]
(ξ) is independent of
i; also, pit+1(U) ≡ pit+1(ξu) ≡ pit+1(ξ−i) and pit+1(S) ≡ pi(ξi)t+1, for all i.
First, we observe that an optimal production choice corresponds to the solution of a finite number
of static problems determining the net-supply or -output function. For a young-age,
st(pt) = max
kt≥0
[f(At+ι−1, kt)− kt]
For an old-age, I + 1 state-contingent ex-post problems define a net-output profile: for all ξ ∈ Ξ,
st+1(pt)(ξ) = max
kt+1(ξ)≥0
[f(At+1, kt+1)− kt+1] (ξ)
These problems are (strictly) concave programs, delivering a unique solution, a maximizer input
and net-output profile, (
k∗t , (k
∗
t+1(φ))φ∈Φ
)
,
(
y∗t , (y
∗
t+1(φ))φ∈Φ
) 0
which also identifies optimal profits pi∗t+1(φ) for all φ ∈ {S,U}.
Second, default-proof debt limits are defined according to (Bt) as the function, B
ι,κ
t : P → [0, κ],
Bι,κt (pt) =
(1− ζ̂)pi∗t+1(pt)(ξu)
Rt+1
This function is continuous and bounded.
Third, the firm maximum problem is also concave in xt, therefore the individually optimal R&D
investment is characterized by its first order condition,
∂ρit
∂xit
[
pi∗t+1(S)− pi∗t+1(U)
]− (Rt+1 + γt) = 0
The left-hand-side of this condition is a continuous function of (pt, γt, Xt), we call it %t(pt, γt, Xt),
where Xt is the aggregate R&D expenditure at t. For any (pt, γt, Xt), %t has a zero x
i∗
t , by the
Intermediate Value Theorem. Indeed, under our assumptions, %t is a strictly decreasing function
of xit; strictly positive as x
i
t → 0 (bc. limx̂i→0 ρix(x̂i, ·) = +∞); negative (or zero) for large enough
xit (bc. limx̂i→+∞ ρ
i
x(x̂
i, ·) = 0). The zero is unique, by strict monotonicity of %t. By the IFT, the
solution,
χi∗t (pt, γt, Xt)
19In particular, we shall use the superscript to distinguish between ρi and ρ.
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is a continuous function on P ×G × [0, Iκ] with positive values xi∗t in [0, κ].
Firm financial decisions. Fourth, optimal equity financing is characterized by a correspondence
ζκ,∗t : P × G × [0, I] × [0, Iκ] → [0, ζ̂] defined as in (ζ) above. This correspondence is clearly
nonempty, upper hemi-continuous (uhc) and convex valued. These properties are inherited by the
bond-holding correspondence,
bκ,∗t (pt, γt, nt+1, Xt) =
(
1− ζκ,∗t (pt, γt, nt+1)
) (
pi∗t − χ∗t (pt, γt, Xt) + eit
)
+ qtζ
κ,∗
t (pt, γt, nt+1)
We are now going to define a multiplier-correspondence. This is, Γκ,∗t : P×G× [0, I]× [0, 1]→ G,
Γκ,∗t (pt, γt, nt+1, Xt) = arg min
γ′t∈G
γ′t
[
bκ,∗t (pt, γt, nt+1, Xt) +Bt(pt)
]
Notice that Γκ,∗t = 0 when the borrowing limit is non-binding, b
κ,∗
t (·, γt) > −Bt and Γκ,∗t = G
otherwise. Hence, such correspondence is clearly closed with non-empty and convex values; and,
because G is compact, it is also uhc. Notice that a fixed point of this correspondence identifies a
multiplier that makes the complementary slackness condition of problem (fP ) hold.
Firm choice correspondence. Concluding, we can define the firm choice correspondence, Sι,,κt :
P × [0, I]× [0, Iκ]→ Fκt × [0, ζ̂]× [−Bt, κ]×G such that,
Sι,,κt (pt, nt+1, Xt) = (×k∈{0,1}sιt+k × xι∗t )× ζκ,∗t × bκ,∗t × Γκ,∗t
where Fκt := [0, κ]3 × [0, κ]. By the properties of each of one of its components, we conclude that,
Lemma 3. Sι,,κt is nonempty, compact and convex valued, upper hemi-continuous.
License demand. Consider a single entrepreneur of type i, born in t. Si,ι,,κt represents the choice of i
corresponding to her decision to initiate either a mature (ι = 1) or a start-up (ι = 0). Accordingly,
for any tuple (pt, nt+1, Xt) in P × [0, I] × [0, Iκ], (V i,1t , V i,0t ) represent the expected (indirect)
utilities of an entrepreneur i, born in t, resulting from the two alternatives. These are continuous
functions of (pt, nt+1, Xt) by Berge’s maximum theorem. The technology adoption decision, to buy
a patent license, at t is represented by the correspondence ιi,t : P × [0, I]× [0, Iκ]→ {0, 1} defined
such that,
ιi,t (pt, nt+1, Xt) =
{
1 if V i,1t (pt, ·) ≥ V i,0t
0 otherwise.
Next, assume that there is a continuum of entrepreneurs of every type i, measurable in the unit
interval. The measure of type i entrepreneurs demanding a licence is, µi, : P×[0, I]×[0, Iκ]→ [0, 1]
such that,
µi,t (pt, nt+1, Xt) =

1 if V i,1t (pt, ·) > V i,0t
[0, 1] if V i,1t (pt, ·) = V i,0t
0 otherwise.
The aggregate demand of licenses at t is µt =
∑
i µ
i,
t : P × [0, I]× [0, Iκ]→ [0, I].
Lemma 4. µi,t is nonempty, compact and convex valued, upper hemi-continuous. These properties
aggregate to µt.
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Proof. For all i, t, µi,t is clearly nonempty, convex valued, with a closed graph. The graph is one
of a step function, taking value 1 up to some p¯t ≥ 0, being the whole interval [0, 1] at p¯t, and
taking value zero for any pt > p¯t. As the range [0, 1] is compact, by the closed graph theorem, the
correspondence is uhc. Finally, these properties aggregate to µt. 
Entrepreneur choice correspondence. We now define a type i entrepreneur, choice correspondence
as, (
Sit × µit
),κ
Lemma 3 and 4 imply,
Lemma 5.
(
Sit × µit
),κ
is nonempty, compact and convex valued, uhc.
License supply and equilibrium. Suppose we keep considering time t. License are supplied by a
single, successful entrepreneur, who is currently old. This entrepreneur acts as a monopolist, fixing
the price pt so as to maximize revenue from licence sales, given the market demand correspondence
µt of currently young entrepreneurs.
The monopolist solves the maximum problem,
(mP ) ψt (pt, nt+1, Xt) = arg max
p′t∈[0,1/]
p′t · µt(p′t, nt+1, Xt)
where ψt : P× [0, I]× [0, Iκ]→ [0, 1/]. This–if it is nonempty– determines a monopoly equilibrium
price in the license market open at time t.
We point out that the monopoly problem is independent of i. It is obvious that whoever is the
patent holder acts as a monopolist facing a market demand correspondence that is type-independent.
This is used both to determine the equilibrium prices p∗t and p
∗
t+1; although, for p
∗
t , the monopolist
is an agent who is a member of another economy (i.e. a member of the generation preceding the
one in E(φat+1)–i.e. of the generation in E(φt)- with φt = Pt(φat+1)).
Lemma 6. The monopolist problem (mP ) has a solution.
Proof. Define a licence price correspondence to be ςt : [0, I]→ P such that,
(+) ςt (nt) =
{
arg max
0≤p′t≤1/
p′t · nt
}
where nt is the overall measure of entrepreneurs demanding a licence at t. Then, define the licence-
market correspondence ξt : P × [0, I]× [0, Iκ]→ P × [0, I] such that
ξt (pt, nt, Xt) = ς

t (nt)× µt(pt, nt, Xt).
The licence-market correspondence computes all the alternative pairs (pt, nt) which the patent
holder can possibly face, when it comes to sell licences. This computation has a solution if this
correspondence has a fixed point, in which case the monopoly problem is well defined. More
precisely, we are going to establish that ςt and ξ

t , are nonempty, compact and convex valued, uhc;
hence, by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, ξt has a fixed point (p
∗
t , n
∗
t ). Among such fixed points,
which lie in a compact set, some will yield maximum revenue to the patent holder, i.e. yield licence
prices in ψt .
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The correspondence ςt. As all variables considered are contemporaneous, let us drop time
subscript t. ς is nonempty by Weierstrass’ theorem, because for every nt, ς
 · nt is a continuous
(linear) function defined on a compact set. If we view the constrained set of the maximization
problem in (+) as a constant correspondence,  : P → [0, I] such that (pt) = [0, I] for all pt in
P; then the constrain set is obviously a nonempty, compact valued and continuous correspondence.
Therefore, by Berge’s Maximum theorem, we conclude that, for all nt ∈ (P), ς(nt) defined in
(+) is an uhc and compact-valued correspondence. Finally, the linearity of ς(nt) implies that it
is also convex valued.
We have shown that ξ has a fixed point (p∗t , n
∗
t ), which says that p
∗
t ∈ ς(n∗t ) and n∗t ∈ µ(p∗t , ·).
Let P ∗t be the set of fixed points licence-prices. Observe that for all p
∗
t ∈ P ∗t , 0 ≤ p∗t · µ(p∗t , ·) ≤
(1/)I identifies monopoly revenue values on the real line. As such points can be ordered, a
maximum solution to (mP ) exists, although its argument p∗t may not be unique.
The same proof applies to derive the equilibrium price p∗t+1 for the given conjecture of the the
license-demand correspondence in t+ 1. 
Fund payoff correspondence. The fund payoff (perturbed) correspondence is defined as,
β,κ : [0, κ]4J → [0, κ]3, β,κ(pit, pit+1, ζ) = (Πb,,κt ,Πa,,κt+1 ), where,
Πb,,κt =
1∑
i∈Et n
i
tζ
i
t + J
[∑
i∈Et
nit(ζ
i
t + )pi
i
t
]
,
Πa,κt+1(φ) =
1∑
i∈Et n
i
tζ
i
t
∑
i∈Et
nitζ
i
tEit[piit+1|φ], pi ∈ Φ
Household decisions. Let the budget set of h be, Bh,,κt ≡ Bh,,κt
(
pt,Π
,κ
t+1
)
Bh,,κt =
{
(ct+1, θ
h
t , b
h
t ) ∈ [0, κ]2 × [0, κ]× [−κ, κ] :
bht ≤ eht −
(
qt −Πbt
)
θht
cht+1(φ) ≤ eht+1 + bhtRt+1 + θht Πat+1(φ), φ ∈ Φ
}
The household h demand correspondence is, Dh,,κt : P × [0, κ]→ [0, κ]2 × [0, κ]× [−κ, κ] such
that,
Dh,,κt
(
pt,Π
,κ
t+1
)
= arg max
{
uh (ct+1) : (ct+1, θ
h
t , b
h
t ) ∈ Bh,,κt
(
pt,Π
,κ
t+1
)}
Omitting, for simplicity, the superscript h, we can establish the following. Since B,κt is compact
and u is continuous, D,κ is nonempty. Since B,κt is convex and u is quasi-concave, D
,κ is
convex valued. By the continuity of u and Berge’s maximum theorem, D,κt is uhc if the budget
correspondence is continuous (lhc and uhc). The graph of B,κt is closed in P × [0, κ] × [0, κ]2
and [0, κ] is compact, so B,κt is uhc. lhc follows by standard arguments (e.g. Dre´ze et al., 2008),
analogous to those used above for the firm’s constrained correspondence χι,,κt .
Competitive markets auctioneer. The idea is to determine the equilibrium price of competitive
markets, (q∗t , R
∗
t+1), defining an auctioneer demand correspondence, in the spirit of Debreu (1958),
as Φ,κt :
(
Fκt × [0, ζ̂]
)J
× ([−κ, κ]× [0, κ])H → [0, 1/]2 such that,
Φ,κt = arg max
q̂t,R̂t
{
q̂t
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
)
+ R̂−1t+1b¯t :
(
q̂t, R̂
−1
t+1
)
∈ [0, 1/]2
}
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This correspondence has all the desired properties: it is nonempty, compact and convex valued,
uhc.
R&D aggregator. Using the short hand notation gt = g(xt, At), for any given At, we define the
following composition,
αt := gt ◦
(×i∈Etχi∗t ) : Pt ×Gt × [0, Iκ]→ [0, Iκ]
such that X∗t = gt
(×iχi∗t , At). Hence, αt is a continuous function.
Equilibrium existence.
Lemma 7. For all (, κ)−box one-generation economy, E,κ(φat+1), an equilibrium exists.
Proof. For all t ∈ {0, 1, .., T}, the equilibrium is described by a tuple,
e,κt =
(
((yit+k)k=0,1, x
i
t, ζ
i
t , b
i
t, γ
i
t , n
i
t)i∈E , (Π
b,,κ
t ,Π
a,,κ
t+1 ), (c
h
t+1, b
h
t , θ
h
t )h∈H, (qt, pt, pt+1, R
−1
t+1, Bt), Xt
)
,
an element of the set,
E,κt =
(
Fκt × [0, ζ̂]× [−κ, κ]×Gt × [1, I]
)I
×[0, κ]3×([0, κ]2 × [−κ, κ]× [0, κ])H×Pt×[−Bt, κ]×[0, Iκ]
The equilibrium correspondence is Σ,κt : E
,κ
t → E,κt be defined as,
Σ,κt = ×i∈E
(
Sit × µit × Γi∗t
),κ × β,κt ×h∈H (Dht ),κ × Φ,κt × ψt+1 × αt
Using the above lemmata, we conclude that the equilibrium correspondence has a fixed point e,κt ,
by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. 
We are now ready to prove proposition 2, by showing that an equilibrium e,κt of a box-economy
converges to an equilibrium of the original economy, E(φat+1). To this end, first, we prove that e
,κ
t
converges to eκt , as  goes to zero, and then that it remains in the interior of the κ−box as κ goes
to infinity. Observe that, as the equilibrium set is interior to a box, it is also compact.
Proof of proposition 2. Consider an equilibrium e,κ and the associated aggregate variables, as
above, denoted with an upper-bar. Using the auctioneer correspondence, we now show that –as 
goes to zero (and for given κ)– e,κt remains bounded and markets clear.
By monotonicity of preferences, at equilibrium, all budget constraints hold with equality. The
typical young entrepreneur i and household h, respectively, have the following constraints, which
only differ from the original because we let R−1t+1 denote the price of a zero-coupon bond,
eit +
(
1− ζit
)
piit + qtζ
i
t −R−1t+1bit − xit = 0, eht −R−1t+1bht −
(
qt −Πb,,κt
)
θht = 0;
Aggregating the budget constraint of young agents in t, at a patent-market equilibrium, we find,
0 =e¯t + y¯t − x¯t −
∑
i∈Et
νitζ
i
tpi
i
t + qtζ¯t −R−1t+1
∑
i∈Et
νitb
i
t+
−R−1t+1
∑
h
bht − qtθ¯t + Πb,,κt θ¯t
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Then, using the definition of the equity-fund return, substitute in the latest for,∑
i∈Et
νitζ
i
tpi
i
t = ζ¯tΠ
b,,κ
t + 
[
JΠb,,κt −
∑
i∈Et
νi,ιt pi
i
t
]
This, changing signs, yields,
(f1) 0 = x¯t − e¯t − y¯t −Πb,,κt
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
)− Lb,t + qt (θ¯t − ζ¯t)+R−1t+1b¯t
where,
Lb,t ≡ −
[
JΠb,,κt − p¯it
]
Next, observe that x¯t − e¯t − y¯t − Πb,,κt
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
) ≤ Lb,t ; otherwise, if this were holding with >,
qt
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
)
+ R−1t+1b¯t < 0, which cannot be, at equilibrium, without violating the auctioneer op-
timality (there would be a gain in setting the prices to zero). More precisely, we notice that
(θ¯t − ζ¯t) > 0 implies an equilibrium price qt = 1/ and (θ¯t − ζ¯t) = 0 any price qt ∈ [0, 1/].
Therefore, using also the fact that, at equilibrium, ptnt ≥ 0,
1

(θ¯t − ζ¯t) = e¯+ y¯t − ptnt − xt + Πb,,κt
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
)
+ Lb,t
≤ e¯t + y¯t + Πb,,κt Jζ̂ + Lb,t
All this implies,
0 ≤ θ¯t − ζ¯t ≤ 
∣∣∣e¯t + y¯t + Πb,,κt Jζ̂ + Lb,t ∣∣∣
and, similarly,
0 ≤ b¯t ≤ 
∣∣∣e¯t + y¯t + Πb,,κt Jζ̂ + Lb,t ∣∣∣
Finally, we can use the latest in (f1) to bound the net-expenditure,
x¯t + ptnt − (e¯t + y¯t) = Πb,,κt
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
)
+ Lb,t −
[
qt
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
)
+R−1t+1b¯t
]
≤ Πb,,κt
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
)
+ Lb,t
≤ Πb,,κt
∣∣∣Πb,,κt Jζ̂ + Lb,t ∣∣∣+ Lb,t
Now, consider the budget constraints of the old individuals, at t+ 1,
cit+1 = e
i
t+1 + (1− ζit)piit+1 + bit, cht+1 = eht+1 + bht + Πa,,κt+1 θht ,
By taking expectations over Ξ with respect to (P it )i for all entrepreneurs i ∈ Et, conditional to each
aggregate state φ, and aggregating over the individuals,
(c¯t+1 − e¯t+1 − y¯t+1)(φ) +
[∑
i∈Et
νitζ
i
tEi[piit+1|φ]
]
−Πa,κt+1(φ)θ¯t − b¯t = 0
Reiterating the above transformation, we find,
(c¯t+1 − e¯t+1 − y¯t+1)(φ)− pt+1nt+1(φ)−Πa,κt+1(φ)
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
)− b¯t − La,t+1(φ) = 0
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where, La,t+1(φ) ≡ 
[
JΠa,,κt+1 − p¯it+1
]
(φ)
(c¯t+1 − e¯t+1 − y¯t+1)(φ) = pt+1nt+1(φ) + Πa,κt+1(φ)
(
θ¯t − ζ¯t
)
+ b¯t − La,t+1(φ)
≤ pt+1nt+1(φ) + Πa,κt+1(φ)
[
e¯+ y¯t + Π
b,,κ
t Jζ̂ + Lb,t
]
+ b¯t − La,t+1(φ)
≤ pt+1nt+1(φ) + 
(
Πa,κt+1(φ) + 1
) [
e¯+ y¯t + Π
b,,κ
t Jζ̂ + Lb,t
]
+ |La,t+1(φ)|
As  → 0, the equilibrium sequence e,κt remains finite if prices stay finite. First, consider the
monopoly price pt+1. As pt+1 increases without bound, the current license demand goes to zero,
hence pt+1nt+1 ≤ −1nt+1 would converge to zero. Since the latest is not optimal for the monopolist,
we achieve a contradiction.
For completeness, suppose qt goes to infinity as  goes to 0. Then, currently young entrepreneurs
will want to issue equities and reduce debt and households would like to adjust theirs portfolios
in the opposite direction. If the box defined by κ is large enough to contain the loan supply, a
contradiction to households’ optimality is reached. An analogous argument applies to R−1t+1. Hence,
we conclude that the whole equilibrium sequence converges as  goes to zero.
Finally, to complete the the proof, we now show that, by choosing κ large enough, the equilibrium
variables remain in the interior of the cube. We know that for all κ an equilibrium of the box-
economy exists. Considering an increasing sequence (κn), by compactness of the set of attainable
allocations, the corresponding sequences of attainable consumption, capital, and equity-fund payoffs
converge. Furthermore, by old-age individuals’ budget constraints, also financial positions in loans
and equities converge. Hence, for sufficiently large n, the cube is non-binding and all the allocations
are interior.

Proposition 8. For all T ≥ 1 and all T−finite economy E(T ) an equilibrium exists. Moreover,
the equilibrium set is compact.
Proof. An equilibrium exists for every T− finite economy E(T ), by proposition 2 and the application
of the equilibrium algorithm in definition 5. This allows to determine the equilibrium set as a subset
of the product ×T−1t=0 Σt. Moreover, the equilibrium set of finite economies is compact as ×T−1t=0 Σt is
compact. 
4.1.2. Equilibrium existence in a OLG truncated economy. Recall that a T− truncated economy is
a T−finite economy E(T ) in which assets and patent licenses can be traded at all dates t < T and
spot markets are open at all dates t ≤ T . We think at this economy as one in which debt limits
are zero for all individuals and licenses nT = 0, at all truncation dates T . Equilibrium existence
for such an economy trivially follows from proposition 8 and is therefore stated without proof.
Corollary 9. For all T ≥ 1 and all T−truncated economy, an equilibrium exists. Moreover, the
equilibrium set is compact.
4.1.3. Equilibrium existence - proof of theorem 1. Consider equilibria of T -truncated economies.
Passing to equilibrium subsequences, as T goes to infinity, such subsequences converge, in the prod-
uct topology, to an equilibrium; this is so since, for every T , the equilibrium set of a T−truncated
economy is (nonempty and) compact by corollary 9. This completes the proof of theorem 1.
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